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PART IV. SKEPTICISM 
217 The idea that law is an artifact is commonly accepted among legal theorists. 
For example, Brian Leiter and Frederick Schauer reject an "essentialist" 
approach to analyzing the concept of law on the ground that law is an arti-
 
239 fact and hence subject to change.' John Gardner analyses the relationship 
between law as a genre of artifacts, on the one hand, and legal systems (basic 
units) and laws (sub-units) as artifacts belonging to this genre, on the other.2 
269 Neil MacCormick and Kenneth Ehrenberg advocate the functional analysis 
of law since, in the case of artifacts, functions seem to play an important 
role .3  Leslie Green rejects the possibility of applying an intention-based ana-
lysis to the "law" as such but endorses this kind of analysis in the case of 
particular norms, branches of law or legal institutions.' Surprisingly, for all 
these statements, a complete analysis of what the claim that law is an artifact 
ontologically entails and what consequences, if any, this claim has for philo-
sophical accounts of law has yet to be made. 
This state of affairs is more surprising given the fact that the general philo-
sophical discussion about the nature of artifacts is very rich and tends to 
alternate between four different notions relevant to law—namely, intention, 
function, history, and action. Most conceptual theories of artifacts high-
light, in some way, the concept of intention as playing a role in the exist-
ence conditions for artifacts. Indeed, Risto Hilpinen explicates the nature 
of artifacts in terms of an author's intentions, thus considering the concepts 
of "author" and "authorship" as central when accounting for the artifac-
tual domain.' Lynne Rudder Baker situates the author's intention within 
a necessary functional framework, connecting the existence of an artifact 
with the author's intention to produce an object able to perform a specific 
See Brian Leiter, 'The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Scepticism' 
(2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 663; Brian Leiter, 'Why Legal Positivism (Again)?' 
(University of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 442) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2323013> 
accessed 20 March 2017; Frederick Schauer, '  On the Nature of the Nature of Law' (2012) 98 Archiv 
fir Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 457. 
2  See John Gardner, 'The Legality of Law' (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 168. 
See Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law (Oxford University Press 2007); Kenneth 
M. Ehrenberg, 'Defending the Possibility of a Neutral Functional 'Theory of Law' (2009) 29 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 91; Kenneth M. Ehrenberg, The Functions of Law (Oxford University 
Press 2016). 
' See Leslie Green, 'The Functions of Law' (1998) 12 Cogito 117. 
See Risto Hilpinen, 'Authors and Artifacts' (1993) 93 Proceedings oftheAristotelian Society 155. 
11. A Strange Kind of Artifact 
Giovanni Tuzet 
12. Not All Law Is an Artifact: Jurisprudence Meets 




238 Giovanni Tuzet 
the answers to the different questions about it. So I praise holism concerning 
answers. 
For the purpose of conceptual clarity our questions should be as distinct 
as possible; but for the purpose of understanding, the answers should be as 
integrated as possible. 
Take the examples I used above, fork and forfeiture. A why-question about 
the fork artifact receives an answer in terms of function: it is made to spear 
food. But we saw that this is insufficient to distinguish it from other things 
that can be used to spear food. So a what-question is needed to specify some 
structural properties of the artifact. And a combination of the answers gives a 
full understanding of it. Similarly for the legal institution of forfeiture: if we 
ask a what-question about it, the simple answer is that it is the authoritative 
deprivation of money or property without compensation; but this answer 
tells you nothing about the function the measure has, which in fact can be 
diverse. So a why-question about this legal institution is needed if you wish to 
have a full understanding of it, while the relevant what-question is necessary 
to distinguish it from other (legal) measures that perform the same functions. 
Question-atomism and answer-holism are methodological recipes for our 
understanding of the world and of artifacts in particular. The answer to a 
why-question and the answer to a what-question illuminate each other and 
the phenomenon at stake. We must try to do this with law as well, in order to 
integrate and harmonize our understanding of what it is and of the causes or 
reasons why it is created, used, interpreted, and applied. 
12 
Not All Law Is an Artifact 
Jurisprudence Meets the Common Law 
Dan Priel* 
1. Introduction 
Brian Leiter has recently suggested that anyone who denied law's artifactuality, 
"the extravagance of their metaphysical commitments would.., be a subject 
for psychological, not philosophical investigation." There is a sense in which 
he is unquestionably right. If by artifact we mean the product of human 
effort, the claim is obviously true, indeed so obviously true that I do not 
know anyone who denies it. After some light interrogation it turns out that 
even some of the usual suspects have to be released without charges. It is 
accepted by John Finnis, who described law as "a cultural object, constructed, 
or ... posited by creative human choices, [which] is an instrument, a tech-
nique adopted for a moral purpose, and adopted because there is no other 
available way of agreeing over significant spans of time about precisely how 
to pursue the moral project well.112 Lon Fuller is not guilty either: he spoke 
of the lawyer as an "architect of social structures" and gave a central role in 
his writings, far more than his critics have, to the importance of institutional 
* I thank Luka Burazin and two anonymous referees for their detailed comments on earlier 
drafts. Space limitations have forced me to cut more than a third of the original manuscript. The 
excised part provided a far more detailed demonstration of the way attempts to explain the common 
law within the law-as-artifact ideological framework lead to artificial and unconvincing accounts of 
the common law. The longer version is available upon request. 
Brian Leiter, "The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism" in 
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán et al. (eds.), Neutrality and Theory ofLaw (Springer 2013) 161, 164. 
2  John Finnis, "Natural Law and Legal Reasoning" in Robert P. George (ed.), Natural Law 
Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford University Press 1992) 134, 141. 
Law as an Artifact. First Edition. Edited by Luka Burazin, Kenneth Einar Himma, and Corrado 
Roversi. Chapter 12 © Dan Priel 2018. Published 2018 by Oxford University Press. 
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design to the traditional questions of jurisprudence.' Even everyone's favorite 
punching bag, Ronald Dworkin, can plead innocence.' Unless one is willing 
to argue that Finnis, Fuller, and Dworkin were all deeply confused about their 
own views, their examples show that the artifactuality of law, if understood as 
the claim that law is the product of human efforts, is an uncontentious claim. 
I think there is a different way of understanding law's artifactuality. It is 
(roughly) that law is the product of purposive action, that it is the product of 
design. Understood in this way, the claim that law (in general) is an artifact 
is, I think, by no means trivial. In fact, I will argue that with respect to one 
familiar form of law it is false. Before proceeding to defend my claim, let me 
assure the tough-minded reader that my claim that not all law is an artifact 
in no way depends on any commitment to the idea that some law exists as 
a brooding omnipresence in the sky waiting patiently through the eons for 
humans to first evolve and then, several millennia later, to discover it. I can 
be spared psychological examination because the view I present is meant to 
convince even the most hardened of jurisprudential naturalists. I consider 
the uber-naturalist Jeremy Bentham an ally in the argument I present below. 
To say that not all law is an artifact may be controversial enough; to make 
things worse I will further argue that the claim that all law is an artifact is not 
a neutral, hard-headed description of what law really is, arrived at after we rid 
ourselves of metaphysical excesses, aspirations, idealizations, and confusions. 
Rather, the claim that law is an artifact is an ideological claim. It is an ideology 
that many contemporary legal theorists, of very different stripes, consider so 
obvious that they elevate it to the level of a conceptual truth about what they 
call "the nature of law." I will not challenge this ideology for no other reason 
that I am sympathetic to it. Nevertheless, I recognize it for what it is: not a 
universal truth about law wherever and whenever we find it, but a normative 
stance. 
As should be obvious from this chapter's title, my example of non-
artifactual law is the common law. To demonstrate this conclusion I begin 
by explaining what I mean by artifact. I argue that artifacts are functional 
See Lon L. Fuller, "The Lawyer as an Architect of Social Structures" in The Principles of Social 
Order (rev. edn., Hart Publishing 2001) 285; Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev. edn., Yale 
University Press 1969) 178 (talking about the "architectural design of legal institutions"). 
Dworkin's analogy between law and the chain novel, where each participant has a creative role, 
is one indication. Contrary to popular belief, Dworkin did not think that law pre-exists humans 
who discover it. He ridiculed the idea in no uncertain terms. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Right 
Seriously (rev. edn., Harvard University Press 1978) 216, 337. As he also said, the sense of inter-
pretation central to his conception of law is "creative." See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard 
University Press 1986) 50. 
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designed objects. On the basis of this definition I argue in Section 3 that the 
common law, or at least some of its central manifestations, is not an artifact. 
In Section 4 I turn to explaining the broader jurisprudential significance of 
this point. I argue that the dominant view today that all law is an artifact is 
not a conceptual truth, but an ideological claim. It reflects a particular view 
of law as a tool for improving society. 'This view ignores a competing ideology 
(on which much common law thinking is based) which rejects this concep-
tion of law. I briefly conclude by suggesting that recognizing the ideological 
nature of this view, together with the particular view of law as a tool should 
help reorient jurisprudence in a new direction—away from description and 
understanding, and toward construction and engineering. 
2. Design, Function, and Artifactuality 
In this section I present the analytical framework that will serve me for the 
jurisprudential argument that follows. This is not an exercise in conceptual 
analysis in the sense of trying to capture what artifactuality really is. It is 
meant to help clarify and define the terms I will use in the remainder of 
the chapter. Though I cannot prove it, I think it reflects prevailing linguistic 
usage, but as I explain below, my argument is not affected in a significant way 
even if it does not. 
2.1 Physical Artifacts 
Artifacts, as I understand them, are functional objects, which are purposely 
designed. This definition has three elements. Designedobjects are non-randomly 
organized. Part of the explanation of a designed object calls for identifying a 
design mechanism that explains how the object's design came about. The most 
obvious design mechanism is a conscious, intentional being—a designer—
that is responsible for the non-random organization. For a long time it was 
thought that a designer is the only design mechanism (hence, for example, 
the argument from design to the existence of God), but we now know of de-
sign mechanisms that dispense with a designer: Adam Smith's invisible hand 
and natural selection are probably the best-known ones, but there are others 
as well. To use a well-known example, a path can come into existence without 
any purposeful design.' In this example, a non-randomly organized object 
T.E. Holland, The Elements ofJurisprudence (12th edn., Oxford University Press 1917) 57, 
which also draws the analogy between the formation of a path and the emergence of custom. 
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(path) can emerge without a designer because of the advantage, however slight, 
conferred on any individual in following on the footsteps of others. Notice 
that in this case even though the design depends on the intentional actions 
of individuals, none of them may have any intention to create a path. Other 
design mechanisms (for example, natural selection) are less intuitive, because 
they show how order can emerge in the absence of any intentional action. 
Within the domain of designed objects, then, we can distinguish between 
those that are purposely and those that are non-purposely designed. Within 
the category of purposely designed objects we can further distinguish be-
tween functional and non-functional objects. On my definition, works of 
art are artifacts only if they are functional. That may be controversial, but 
it seems to me a plausible distinction, allowing us to distinguish between 
so-called "decorative arts" and crafts, which are artifacts, and other artistic 
creations (for instance, symphonies) which are not. However, this distinction 
ultimately depends on a question I will not address, whether some or even 
all art has a function (improving morals, increasing happiness, or whatever). 
Depending on one's answer to this question, some (or even all) works of art 
may count as artifacts. 
CJ Function is normative in the sense that it is (or provides) an evaluable 
standard of success. Given a function, some artifacts will perform it better 
than others. In some cases, an object will be so poor at performing the 
function it was intended to perform, that we will not consider it a specimen 
of an artifact type. One may genuinely intend to build an airplane, but the 
object he produces is so spectacularly incapable of flying that it will not be 
an airplane. This standard of success may seem straightforward, but there is 
a twist. In my classification crafts and other decorative objects are artifacts, 
but they are a special kind of artifact, because their function is aesthetic, 
and as such it is determined by contingent cultural standards. The success 
of a decorative item is assessed against certain aesthetic standards of a par-
ticular community, or of objects of that type. To be sure, even in the case of 
other artifacts, there is a particular cultural context in which the function 
of the artifact makes sense (a screwdriver can perform its function only in 
an environment where screws exist), but one can give a description of the 
way the design serves the function without invoking the cultural context. 
By contrast, with cultural artifacts their description of the way they perform 
their function must include this context. Neckties, for example, perform a 
decorative function but also signal seriousness or respectability on the part of 
their wearer. That they perform this function is a purely conventional signal 
understood within a particular culture. The very idea that wearing a necktie 
has this meaning, as well as the particular designs that convey that meaning, 
cannot be understood without invoking neckties' cultural context. When this 
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is the case, we can call the function in question "cultural function" to distin-
guish such a function from the function performed by other artifacts, which 
I will call "teleological function." 
Obviously, there are many artifacts with both cultural and teleological 
functions, and the balancing of the two elements is a familiar design problem 
(think of watches), one that may be exacerbated by the fact that there may be 
disagreement over whether a given function is teleological or cultural. The im-
portant point for the discussion that follows is that the two kinds of function 
are normatively different. They employ different notions of success and employ 
different methods for achieving their respective modes of success. 
Table 12.1 gives a rough guide of what I take to be the scope of artifactuality. 
In my definition artifacts are objects that are functional and purposely 
designed. I don't treat this definition as an attempt to capture "the" con-
cept of an artifact, because I do not think such a thing exists. The definition 
aims to capture a useful category. I do not consider debates over the scope 
of artifactuality—whether it includes all works of art, whether it includes 
humans (or "designer dogs," humans who underwent plastic surgery, genet-
ically modified foods, reproductions of original paintings, or rocks that are 
being used as door stops)—to be particularly important, for there is no nature 
of artifactuality to identify and demarcate. Some may think that some of these 
objects are artifacts and others will not. There is no way of showing one person 
is correct on such matters while someone else is wrong (unless by "correct" we 
mean more prevalent among people). What exists is human language, used 
to communicate thought and guide action. Humans apparently succeed in 
doing that with imperfectly regimented, and somewhat differently regimented 
concepts. The view that behind this linguistic diversity there is a single cat-
egory is not warranted; and even if such categories exist, it is not explained how 
the methods of philosophers (wholly conducted within the language they are 
supposed to transcend) are useful, or even relevant, to discover such categories. 
Table 12.1 Identifying artifacts 
Design Conscious Function Artifact 
design 
Rock No No No No 
Tiger Yes No No No 
Heart Yes No Teleological No 
Kandinsky's Composition WI Yes Yes Controversial Depends on 
functionality 
Necktie Yes Yes Cultural Yes 
Tea kettle Yes Yes Teleological Yes 
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Reflection or debate on category-boundaries may lead some people to change 
their mind, but this is not because one categorization is correct while others 
are not; it is because one becomes convinced that a particular categorization 
is more useful.' The study of categories and classifications should not be under-
stood as an attempt to find "real" categories; it is valuable for what it reveals about 
those who categorize the world in this way. This is the central assumption that 
underlies the argument in the remainder of this chapter. 
With all this in mind, I can state that I believe my definition roughly 
corresponds to prevailing usage, but it is unlikely that there will be perfect 
agreement on such matters. I already mentioned that on my definition not all 
art is necessarily an artifact, a claim that others are likely to contest. For an-
other example of possible disagreement, consider Daniel Dennett's provoca-
tive suggestion that organisms and organs are artifacts.' He did this in order 
to emphasize the fact that the mechanism of design does not matter for the 
end-product being designed. Dennett did not commit a "conceptual" or "cat-
egory" error when he said that humans are artifacts. Nevertheless, Dennett's 
usage is probably unusual, as the typical contrast is between artifacts and 
natural objects, and in this contrast humans (together with the rest of the 
biological world) belong firmly in the "natural." Nevertheless, it is perfectly 
legitimate for him to define artifactuality the way he did to stress the sense in 
which humans are designed objects, even if they had no designer. 
2.2 Intellectual Artifacts 
It is not obvious that in everyday usage "artifact" includes purely intellectual 
objects, but we can extend the scope of the term to such objects if we under-
stand intellectual artifacts as the creation or organization of objects with mean-
ingful semantic content. Intellectual artifacts can thus refer to the creation or 
organization of propositions (information) or of prescriptions (algorithms). 
The value of limiting artifactuality to products of conscious design is even 
more evident in the domain of intellectual objects than in the domain of phys-
ical objects. If we use the word "artifact" to refer to all human creations, then 
every thought, every idea, every sentence, perhaps even grunts and hums, 
6  All this is, of course, controversial, and within legal philosophy, a minority view. For a defense 
of these views see Dan Friel, "The Misguided Search for the Nature of Law," available at <https:ll 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3lpapers.cfm?abstracr_id=2642461> accessed June 15, 2017. 
See Daniel C. Dennett, "The Interpretation of Texts, People, and Other Artifacts" (1990) 50 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Supplement) 177, 187. Contrast this with Risto Hilpinen, 
"Authors and Artifacts" (1993) 93 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 155, 156-7, adopting the 
opposite view. 
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would count as artifacts. More significantly for the argument below, such a 
definition of artifactuality will also include many social norms. Even if they 
are not the product of any conscious design, they are still human creations. 
Limiting artifactuality to functional conscious design helps identify a 
narrower and more useful category of intellectual artifactuality, one according 
to which thoughts and spoken sentences are not artifacts, but academic 
papers and legislation are.' Legislation is the product of conscious design 
and it is typically functional in the same way that physical artifacts are, to 
achieve a particular goal: "Why do we allow people to deduct their charit-
able donations?" "Because we want to encourage such donations." Unlike 
legislation, social norms (customs) are also a kind of order (design), but it is 
not typically conscious. Such norms typically emerge without any conscious 
decision by any single person to adopt them. The norm that putting one's 
belongings on a table in a cafeteria designates that table as "taken" even be-
fore one sits down need not be pronounced by anyone, indeed need not even 
be consciously noticed by those who adhere to it. For all we know there was 
never a moment in which such a norm was "authored." 
As mentioned, the element of function in artifactuality is normative: it 
both explains actions and can be used to justify or criticize them. "Why does 
the airplane's wing look the way it does?" "Because this shape reduces drag." 
"But if that is the aim, a somewhat different design would have served that 
goal better." The same is true of intellectual artifacts: "Why was the adver-
tisement written in this way?" "Because our studies have shown that it is an 
effective way of getting people to buy the new product." "It would have been 
even more effective if it had been written differently." 
The distinction between teleological and cultural function encountered 
in the discussion of physical artifacts is significant in relation to intellectual 
objects as well. Teleological justification is a familiar form of explaining legis-
lation: "Why does the Affordable Care Act contain an individual mandate?" 
"Because without one healthy people will not sign up in sufficient numbers 
and that would lead to adverse selection." "In that case, the law should have 
included a public option, as that would have pushed down premiums even 
8  In the text I treat academic papers and legislation as purely intellectual artifacts. In reality, they 
have physical existence in addition to their meaningful content. This may seem a contingent fact, 
for their content could be memorized. While strictly speaking this is true, given the limitations of 
human cognition, I believe the physical instantiation of intellectual artifacts is important for under-
standing their "nature." Some of what I say below about the difference between common law and 
legislation relates to this issue, but it deserves a much more focused discussion than is possible here. 
If I am right, then attempts to provide a timeless account of the nature of law are flawed to the ex-
tent that they ignore the extent to which technological change has changed the physical boundaries 
of law, 
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further." Customary norms, however, are often justified differently. As 
many have noted, when talking about custom, we do not just talk about 
a convergence of behavior; we talk about a justified convergence of be-
havior, with the justification primarily being that others behave in the 
same way. More people go to the beach on warm, sunny days than on 
cold, rainy ones. That convergence, however, does not in itself establish a 
custom. Each person may individually think it more enjoyable to be out 
on a warm day, regardless of others' behavior. By contrast, what counts as 
appropriate attire on the beach is (partly) determined by the changing of 
customs known as "fashion." Here, the justification for the design of items 
to make them fashionable, as well as acting according to the prevailing 
custom, are explicable from within a particular culture and not for the sake 
of promoting a goal. 
Obviously, here too there are often cases of mixed functions. There are 
often good teleological reasons for the existence of a custom over no custom; 
and there are many illuminating studies dedicated to showing how a seem-
ingly pointless custom in fact does promote a goal. For example, there may 
01 be good reasons for preferring the norm according to which the order of 
boarding a bus will be based on the order of arrival at the bus station (rather 
than, say, on the basis of passenger height, age, or by drawing lots). 'What is 
interesting about such explanations is that they are often made with scant 
reference to the attitudes of those who engage in the custom. They assume a 
non-conscious design mechanism that has led people to adopt a certain norm 
with little awareness of whatever goal the norm serves. This is an important 
facet of such norms. It is the existence, and strength, of cultural function 
that explains why customs may persist even when they cannot be shown to 
serve a teleological function (anymore), or even in the face of evidently bad 
consequences. Indeed, in some cases, the lack of a point becomes one of a 
custom's defining characteristics. Defenders of a custom will then criticize 
those who argue for abandoning it for lack of a point, for missing the custom's 
(lack of) point. 
Gathering these points, Table 12.2 provides a rough summary of the way 
my definition of artifactuality relates to two types of intellectual objects: 
Table 12.2 Identifying intellectual artifacts 
Design Conscious Functional Artifact 
design 
Legislation Yes Yes Teleological Yes 
Social norms Yes No Cultural No 
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This is the basic analytic framework for my argument below regarding the 
common law. Before proceeding, three important clarifications are due. First, 
I presented paradigmatic cases of legislation and customary norms in order to 
draw a sharp contrast between intellectual artifacts with non-artifacts. Reality 
is often more complex. Dress norms are often customary, but some people 
("fashion gurus") may acquire a quasi-authoritative role that may shape norms 
in a conscious way. Similarly, rules of etiquette may emerge as purely customary; 
non-consciously designed norms, but at some point certain individuals may 
attain such authoritative status on etiquette that their say-so may be able to 
change behavior. Therefore, it is fur to say that the status of a norm as customary 
is not binary; but a matter of degree. Second, my argument below will be that 
the common law is custom, but it is worth stressing in advance that it is a special 
kind of custom. This will require some further refinement of some of the points 
made so far. Third, the jurisprudential argument that follows does not depend 
on linguistic (or "conceptual") niceties. As mentioned, I think the definition 
I adopted corresponds to prevailing linguistic usage, but nothing changes from 
the argument below if it turns out my usage is unusual, or even deemed wrong. 
Instead of an argument about whether the common law is an artifact, my ar-
gument can be recast in terms of two different kinds of artifact. The rest of the 
argument can then proceed in roughly the same way. Instead of my critique of 
legal theorists who all think of law as an artifact when some of it is not, the argu-
ment can be restated as a critique of the view that law is made up of one kind of 
artifact when in fact it consists of (at least) two. 'What matters is that these two 
categories, however labeled, correspond to two different (political) ideologies.' 
3. The Common Law Is Not an Artifact 
On the basis of the definition of artifactuality in the previous section, in 
this section I consider whether the common law is an artifact. My argu-
ment will be that on a prominent understanding of the common law it is 
not. I will argue that the common law's design level is low, whatever design 
it has is not conscious, and a teleological function does not often play a 
Jonathan Crowe, "Law as an Artifact Kind" (2015) 40 Monach University Law Review 737 
recognizes that customary law poses a difficulty to most accounts of the artifactuality of law. He 
addresses it by offering a disjunctive definition of artifact (ibid. 747), in which artifacts are either the 
products of human design or natural objects "adopted" by humans. Customary law for him belongs 
to the latter category, and so by his definition it is an artifact roughly as a rock "becomes" an artifact 
when someone decides to use it as a door stop. With respect to the common law, all Crowe says is 
that it is an artifact, because "judicial decisions have authors" (ibid. 739).  Even if accepting Crowe's 
classification of artifacts, my argument seeks to show that (a) the common law is closer to customary 
law, and (b) that the distinction between his two kinds of artifact is normatively significant. 
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significant role in its design and development. All these points call for a 
detailed explanation. 
 
3.1 The Common Law Is Custom 
To begin the discussion, consider the following argument outline: 
(1) The common law is law. 
(2) The common law is custom. 
(3) Custom is not an artifact. 
Hence, (4) Not all law is an artifact. 
I will take (1) for granted,'° and in the previous section I argued for (3). 
Custom is undoubtedly the product of human intentional actions (even if 
some of them may have their origins in innate psychological traits), even 
though it is not an artifact in the narrower sense I specified above. That leaves 
defending (2) to complete the argument. It is tempting to add that the truth 
of (2) is similarly uncontroversial for there is a long history of analyzing the 
en common law as custom." This seems to lead straightforwardly to the conclu-
sion that not all law is an artifact. 
An argument along these lines should be appealing to anyone who accepts 
that the path formed by the unplanned, uncoordinated actions of many 
individuals is not an artifact, even though it is unquestionably human made. 
While something like this is the conclusion I ultimately reach, I think the argu-
ment outlined above requires further defense, for what is meant by saying that 
the common law is custom is unclear. In particular, the argument will have to 
address the following objections: First, one might argue that despite the long 
provenance of claims about the customary nature of the common law, it is not 
in fact a custom. It is far too elaborate, or far too organized, to be similar in 
any important sense to customary norms like table etiquette. Second, even if 
the common law is in some sense customary, it might be argued that the word 
"custom" in (2) and (3) has a different meaning. If this is the case, the argu-
ment outlined above is invalid, for it rests on the fallacy of equivocation. 
Discussions on the common law as custom often confuse two related but 
distinct issues: the adoption of customs into the common law, and common-
law practice itselfas custom. The two issues are not always easy to disentangle, 
but they must be kept apart for I am interested here in the second. The first 
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question is of particular interest to legal historians writing on medieval and 
early modern English common law and debating the extent to which it relied 
on local custom. My argument focuses on the different question of the way 
common law norms are designed and justified. It takes as its object common-
law practice itself, as it exists up to this day, even when the adoption of cus-
tomary norms by common-law judges has become a relatively rare occurrence. 
With respect to the latter question, to say that the common law is not 
an artifact is to say that it fails to exhibit at least one of the three features of 
artifactuality; The common law satisfies, to a limited degree, the requirement 
of design. The common law is a non-random organization of intellectual con-
tent, but because of its relative complexity compared with social norms, its 
design level is quite low. There are several mechanisms that help make it more 
organized, but even with those in place, there are countless examples, familiar 
to anyone who studied any common law area, of obscurity; confusion, and 
contradiction within the common law.  12  The more significant sense in which 
common-law practice is customary, and as such non-artifactual, relates to the 
two other elements of artifactuality,  conscious design and functionality, as the 
common law is lacking in both. This statement may seem odd: the common 
law may not be an example of great design, but whatever design we find in 
it looks like it is arrived at through the conscious decisions of judges. Isn't 
reasoned justification a staple of common-law adjudication? These days it is 
(although this is, significantly, much less true of its past), but what matters is 
the kind of explanation we find of common law decisions. 
To understand this point we must have a clearer sense of what we mean by 
the common law. At the most basic level when we talk about the common law, 
we talk about law constructed in some way from judicial pronouncements 
made in the context of the resolution of disputes. That requires having a 
theory of authority explaining in virtue of what these pronouncements are 
in some way binding, and a theory of content explaining how these discrete 
pronouncements are taken together to generate legal norms. To say that the 
common law is custom implies certain answers to both questions that can be 
derived from its practice. Now, it is important to stress that it is wrong to ex-
pect "the common law" to speak with a unitary voice on these issues. For the 
same reasons the common law is often messy at the level of particular legal 
doctrines, it is messy also at the level of its own working theory. The product 
of a multitude of largely uncoordinated individuals working at different 
10  Bentham on occasion denied (1). He was not wrong to do so, because he was not making 
a conceptual claim, or was not trying to capture prevailing attitudes. See the discussion in the 
concluding paragraphs of Section 4.3. 
See Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Clarendon Press 1986) 3-14, 
63-80; C.K. Allen, Law in theMaking (7th edn., Clarendon Press 1964) chs. 1-2, especially at 71-9. 
12  See, e.g., the critical comments (made by both commentators and judges) on the English law 
of defamation collected in Simon Deakin et al., Markesinis andDeakin's Tort Law (7th edn., Oxford 
University Press 2013) 696. Likewise, the state of the economic torts in twentieth-century English 
law has been described as a "mess and [a] muddle" in Hazel Carry, "The Economic Torts in the 21st 
Century" (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 641, 644. 
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periods and in different places is unlikely to produce a perfectly coherent legal 
doctrine; similarly, such product is unlikely to be grounded in identical views 
on authority and content. What I say below is therefore not the whole truth 
in the sense that not all common-law practice fits it, but it reflects a prom-
inent theory underlying much of that practice.'' If the rest of my argument is 
successful, that is enough to show that not all law is an artifact. 
Perhaps the most notable aspect of the common law is that in constructing 
an answer to novel questions the common lawyer is primarily looking to 
existing practice: "this case should be resolved in such-and-such a way, because 
this is how we decided similar cases in the past." Typically these past cases 
are relatively recent, but even when the cases cited and discussed are old, it is 
their present understanding (often quite different from the original one) that 
matters. It is this understanding that is "the law." More significantly, judges 
follow precedents not just in "settled" cases, but also in "novel" ones where 
there is (supposedly) no law governing them. Even in these cases, judges do 
not search for some metaphysically right answer, one that is true before or 
outside of the law. 'There are, in fact, often more citations to past cases in 
appellate cases (which presumably deal with matters on which there is no 
settled law) than in trial cases. The reason is that even in such cases, judges 
seek an answer constructed from an understanding of an existing practice. 
On many occasions there is some attempt to justify the decision in terms of 
certain goals the law seeks to promote: "Policy" arguments, as such arguments 
are typically called, have a long history in the common law, but they remain 
controversial and are typically conducted without much information or expert 
knowledge on the issues. Moreover, such arguments are rarely the only kind 
of argument used. In short, there is rarely an attempt to construct answers to 
outstanding questions by examining directly some goal to be achieved; the 
typical mode of justification in the common law is we decide this case in this 
manner, because this answer fits the way we do things around here." 
Other familiar features of common-law practice reinforce this point. One 
well-known aspect of the common law is that it develops incrementally. It 
is not incrementalism per se that undermines its artifactuality; historians of 
technology have demonstrated (and as anyone who has gone through several 
mobile phones in the last decade will attest), that technological advance is also 
incremental.'4  The evolution of physical artifacts is typically the result of an 
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attempt to improve an existing artifact by measuring it against its purported 
teleological function. By contrast, because common-law justification is often 
"internal"—cultural rather than teleological—the kind of incrementalism we 
find in the common law is different. It develops by way of fitting a current an-
swer within a pattern created by an existing practice. The difference between 
the two may be put this way: artifact design is often based on attempts to 
identify problems with past design and solve them; common-law justification 
typically involves the opposite approach of acting in a particular way because 
of past practice. In the former, past design is relevant in that it may limit one's 
design space, it is an unfortunate constraint. In the latter, on the other hand, 
the past may be a reason in itself to do certain things in a particular way. The 
difference is that only in the latter the fact that things have been done in a 
certain way confers normative value on them. 
This point can be further explicated in relation to the adage that the 
common law "works itself pure." This phrase can be (and has been) rendered 
more modern as the idea that common-law practice aims at internal coher-
ence. Coherence is, at best, a puzzling moral ideal for the law when one thinks 
that law exists to help maintain and promote some external goal and is to be 
evaluated by its success in doing so. 'I But the common law's coherentism 
makes more sense against an internal mode of justification in which par-
ticular instantiations of the practice are measured against some evaluation of 
the practice as a whole. This involves a constant movement between particular 
instantiations (called "cases" in the common law) to a broader picture of the 
whole practice (called "principles"), which are then used to re-evaluate cases. 
Thus, cases are not evaluated for their success in promoting some goal, but 
for their fit into an existing pattern of past cases or some aims extracted from 
them. Within this conception of law, the correctness of a decision, no matter 
how novel, cannot be determined independently of an existing practice. 
The fact that the common law is culturally rather than teleologically 
functional is still consistent with it being an artifact. (The significance of 
the distinction will become clearer later.) But the common law is particu-
larly lacking with respect to the element of conscious design. There are 
numerous statements from commentators (and often judges as well) who 
complain about the messiness, confusion, contradictoriness, and obscurity 
of many of their constituent parts. '6  This is true not just of the common law 
° Elsewhere I identify four different conceptions of common law authority. See Dan Friel, 
"Conceptions of Authority and the Anglo-American Common Law Divide" (2017) 65 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 609. 
14  See George Basalla, The Evolution of Technology (Cambridge University Press 1988); Henry 
Petroski, The Evolution of Useful Things (Knopf 1992). 
15  For a clear example of this puzzlement see Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in 
the Morality ofLaw and Politics (rev. edn., Clarendon Press 1994) ch. 13, especially at 299-30 1. 
16  Here are two examples: Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government.' Citizen Remedies for Official 
Wrongs (Yale University Press 1983) 51 ("Ihe historical legacy of public tort remedies is a jerry-built 
structure, a patchwork, a doctrinal stew. It is a pastiche of policies, precedents, and perspectives 
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today: commentators fail to identify a clear plan in the common law even in 
the days when it was the product of a tiny bench and bar all concentrated 
in London.  17  Given the craft that goes into the writing of judicial opinions, 
such statements may seem too strong, but as I have argued above, inten-
tional individual actions can co-exist with no overall conscious design. That 
the common law is not the result of a plan should be no more difficult to 
accept than the fact that a path can be created without conscious design, even 
though individual actions leading to its creation are intentional. 
 
3.2 Two Objections Answered 
We can now return to the idea that the common law is a kind of custom and, 
in turn, that it is not an artifact. When I argue that common-law practice is 
best understood as a kind of custom, what I meant, and arguably what can 
be gleaned from the writings of the classical exponents of the common law, is 
that its mode of development and especially its mode of justification is cus-
tomary. A central feature of custom is that its primary mode of justification is 
cultural rather than teleological. We see the same distinction in common-law 
thinking, except that instead of the contrast between "cultural" and "teleo-
logical" functions, we find a distinction between "internal" and "external" 
justification. 
If true, the argument outlined in the beginning of this section appears 
sound. To substantiate this conclusion let me respond here to the two 
objections mentioned above. The first was that the well-known claims by clas-
sical exponents of the common law to its customary nature were mistaken. To 
further explain, it might be argued that though the likes of Matthew Hale or 
William Blackstone were involved in the development of the common law, 
they do not enjoy any privileged understanding on what they were doing. 
drawn primarily from three distinctive legal realms and overlaid with features of its own."). Anon. 
[Nicholas St. John Green], "Slander and Libel" (1871) 6 American Law Review 593, 597 ("As the 
English law upon any subject was never constructed upon a plan, it cannot be resolved into one. It 
is a mass which has grown by aggregation, and special and peculiar circumstances have, from time 
to time, shaped its varying surfaces and angles."). 
17  S.F.C. Milsom, "Reason in the Development of the Common Law" (1965) 81 Law Quarterly 
Review 496,497-8 ("There has been no plan in the development of the common law, even less . . . than 
legal historians have sometimes thought"); Roscoe Pound, "the Development of American Law 
and Its Deviation from English Law" (1951) 67 Law Quarterly Review 49, 50 ("the common law 
is little systematized .... The law books of Anglo-American common law are typically alphabet-
ical abridgements, digests, and cydopedias."). More generally see Michael Lobban, "Mapping the 
Common Law: Some Lessons from History" [2011] New Zealand Law Review 21; Geoffrey Samuel, 
"Can the Common Law Be Mapped?" (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journa1271. 
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On this question (so the argument goes), it is legal theorists with their greater 
analytical skills, who can provide a better understanding of the practice. 
The problem with this argument is that it treats all claims by common-law 
practitioners as external observations on the practice, made in a purely the-
oretical mood. In fact, however, these views should be understood as an atti-
tude that these practitioners brought to the practice, and hence helped define 
it. As Joseph Raz put it, "the way a culture understands its own practices and 
institutions is not separate from what they are ... [T]hey ... are in part 
shaped by the way they are understood by the people whose practices and 
institutions they are."" 
Raz's claim needs to be carefully parsed. A judge may genuinely think 
that he is being impartial, treating all defendants in the same way regard-
less of their ethnic backgrounds or gender, but research can reveal him to 
be unconsciously biased. The belief that one is unbiased is not itself part of 
the practice of adjudication; it is an evaluation of one's actions, and such 
evaluations are many times incorrect.'9  The belief that common-law justi-
fication is customary in nature is different to the extent that it shapes the 
practice itself As the illustrations above show, to conceive of the common 
law as custom affects how it is actually practiced, the kind of arguments 
deemed acceptable within it, and the way it develops. To argue that despite 
all this common-law practice is not custom requires showing that there exists 
a certain mythology that is entirely divorced from the practice. This is pos-
sible, but for such an argument to be convincing, it has to be the case, first, 
that the practice is completely different from the way its practitioners under-
stand it. In the case of unconscious bias, such a claim will not be convincing 
without empirical evidence; in the case of the common law, it will require 
providing an alternative explanation for the customary features of common-
law practice. The discussion above was meant to show that familiar features 
of the practice fit its theoretical understanding. Second, to the extent that 
such explanations differ from the way practitioners understand the practice, 
it calls for an explanation of the difference, one that is likely to involve either 
global delusion or massive fraud. 
A further problem with this challenge in this context is that it is self-
defeating. The question under consideration is the possibility of countering 
18  Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason 
(Oxford University Press 2009) 96-7. 
See generally Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves (Harvard University Press 2002). 
The full implications of this view have not been adequately acknowledged in much contemporary 
legal philosophy. See further Dan Priel, 'Action, Politics, and the Normativity of Law" (2017) 8 
Jurisprudence 118. 
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my view that the common law is not an artifact. Its ultimate goal is therefore 
to show that the common law is an artifact in the sense that it is a conscious 
attempt at law-making. But it is inconsistent to argue for this conclusion with 
the arguments that those who think of law as custom are actually mistaken 
about what they are doing. Even ifthey are mistaken, the element of conscious, 
purposive, creation remains lacking. 
The second objection was that the common law may be a kind of custom, but 
it is an unusual kind of custom. If so, it is wrong to draw from the fact that the 
common law is custom and that custom is not an artifact the conclusion that 
the common law is not an artifact. I think this objection is correct in that the 
common law does indeed have some features that set it apart from most cus-
toms. It is more complex than other customs; and it is a custom backed by the 
power of the state, something that is not true of most customs. Most notably, 
the common law today is written and analyzed ("theorized") in a way that other 
customs are not, and it is often analyzed in terms of its ability to protect certain 
"external" goals. All this may imply that the common law is such an unusual 
custom that the argument presented above is invalid. 
Though there are real differences between the common law and other cus-
toms, they do not set the common law apart from other customs in any 
sense relevant for the argument made above. As mentioned earlier, other cus-
toms sometimes have quasi-authoritative guides; and though not typically 
enforced by the state, other customs often have very powerful enforcement 
mechanisms behind them. A powerful social taboo can be far more effective 
than a weakly enforced legal norm. It must also be remembered that those 
who seek to provide a general theory of law must account not just for con-
temporary common law, one that has been much affected and to some extent 
shaped by the dominance of legislative design (more on this below). They 
must also be able to account for the common law as it existed for much of 
its history, including in those times when it was, as common-law historians 
insist, almost entirely lacking in theoretical literature and its most common 
organizing principle was the alphabetical ordering of cases. 
4. Law-as-Artifact as Ideology 
The reader may wonder why the conclusion of the last section is significant. 
Indeed, she may even consider it rather obvious. After some toing and froing 
its conclusion was that the common law is custom; and that is not exactly 
news. The purpose of this section is to explain the broader jurisprudential 
significance of this conclusion. I contend that the view that law is an artifact 
is not a conceptual truth about law (in general), but an ideological one. And  
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though common-law practice is not ideologically uniform,2° a very central 
strand in it rejects the ideology to which the law-as-artifact view belongs. The 
result is unconvincing accounts that attempt to explain the common law as 
something it is not. 
To suggest jurisprudence is "ideological" may seem not just obviously false 
but inflammatory. To call a view "ideological" is sometimes a form of criti-
cism: "His opposition to the new plan had nothing to do with its merits, 
it was purely ideological." Used in this way, ideology is seen as an irrele-
vant consideration, a prejudice. This is not the way I use the term. As I use 
it, it is a set of organizing ideas that individuals use to make sense of the 
world, a way of organizing brute facts, of giving particular events meaning 
within a larger conceptual scheme. Ideology; to use Clifford Geertz's term, is 
a "cultural system."" My claim is that the law-as-artifact is part of a broader, 
evaluative, woridview. Still, even in this sense my claim will likely be resisted. 
General jurisprudence is said by many of its champions to be "conceptual," 
"descriptive," "universal," "morally neutral"—all designations suggesting it is 
non-ideological even in the non-pejorative sense. It is an attempt to provide a 
description of the nature or essence of law wherever and whenever it is found. 
In the prevailing view the claim that law is an artifact may be true or false, 
but it is not right or wrong. 
I have no doubt that those who make these claims believe that they are a 
morally neutral description of law as it is. 'What I attempt to explain is why 
such views are mistaken and why such views make more sense when their 
hidden ideological assumptions are made explicit. Does this show that there 
is no conceptual part to jurisprudence? It does not, though the argument still 
casts doubt on this project  .21  'What it purports to show is that even if there 
are some purely conceptual truths about law, there is value in showing that 
their scope is narrow and that certain features of law currently accepted as 
conceptually true, are not. 
4.1 The Dominant Ideology in Contemporary Jurisprudence 
What I take to be a dominant ideology in contemporary jurisprudence 
consists of two components, both of which are often taken for granted as 
20  See Priel, "Conceptions of Authority and the Anglo-American Common Law Divide" (n. 13). 
21  See Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System" in The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic 
Books 1973) ch. 8. 
22  Elsewhere I do argue that there is no conceptual part to jurisprudence. See Dan Priel, "the 
Scientific Model of Jurisprudence" in Beltrán et al. (eds.), Neutrality and Theory ofLaw (n. 1) 239; 
Priel, "The Misguided Search for the Nature of Law" (n. 6). 
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conceptual truths about law. The first, one which by now should be fa-
miliar, is the thought that law is an instrument consciously designed to solve 
problems. It treats law having a teleological function as a conceptual truth 
about it, and that an important measure of law's success is the extent to which 
it fulfills that function. The second component is a more concrete view about 
the kind of problems that law is designed to solve, and correspondingly the 
primary aim of law. On the view in question the primary aim of the law is to 
solve moral problems, when morality is understood as a kind of fixed set of 
norms for lawyers to match. It follows from putting these two views together 
that law has to match this pre-existing, eternally unchanging set of norms, 
and that law fulfills its (teleological) function when it matches these moral 
norms, thereby serving as an instrument for the better enforcement of mor-
ality. Notice that this instrumental view of law is consistent with thinking 
that the morality law exists to promote is non-consequentialist. 
To illustrate this point consider the views of three contemporary legal 
theorists. Their views differ in fundamental respects, and yet all three endorse 
both points. John Gardner says that "[n] atural law is the same thing as mor-
ality. It is the higher thing to which human law answers."" This view depends 
on the claim, that "[b] eing subject to morality is an inescapable part of being 
m rational .... And being rational ... is part of being human."" The link be-
tween law and morality is thus established in this way: "[morality]  binds us 
by our nature as human beings, while law binds us, to the extent that it does, 
"[flaw only by the grace of morality,"" and in that answers to all moral norms 
in proportion to their ordinary moral importance."" 
Morality is the fixed star, something that any human being, in virtue of 
being a rational animal, can discover; it is something that in virtue of the 
normative demands of rationality all humans ought to follow; and it is the 
standard against which we measure law, In Gardner's view laws are artifacts" 
one of whose measures of success is their ability to guide people: "Whatever 
other purposes law may have, it clearly has the purpose of providing 
23  John Gardner, Law as a Leap ofFaith: Essays on Law in General (Oxford University Press 2012) 
175. Strictly, these words are attributed to natural lawyers, but as far as I can tell, Gardner accepts 
it, as long as the term 'natural law" is replaced with "morality" Gardner's problem with the natural 
law view seems to be that they mistakenly think of morality as a kind of law, not with other aspects 
of this view. See ibid. 
24  Ibid. 150. 25  Ibid. 175. 25  Ibid. 192. 
27  Ibid. 193. Gardner does not define artifact, but it seems he takes artifacts to include all 
products of human action. He explicitly includes in the definition works of art (ibid. 182). Since 
he considers all law an artifact, and considers some laws to be the product of accidents (ibid. 70-1), 
it follows that he thinks artifacts include also the accidental products of intentional action. That 
suggests he considers the wood shavings created in the process of creating a wood carving an artifact. 
(This example is taken from Hilpinen, "Authors and Artifacts" (11. 7)159-60.) 
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law-subjects, including the government, with normative guidance; that is to 
say, of subjecting their conduct to the governance of norms."28  But, crucially, 
law is not about any kind of guidance: the "morally successful law" is one that 
helps us resolve "moral problems .1121 
Scott Shapiro's central idea of law as a plan is, of course, a straightforward 
endorsement of the first aspect of the ideology in question: law, just like all 
planning, "seeks to accomplish the same basic goals that ordinary; garden-
variety planning does, namely, to guide, organize, and monitor the behavior 
of individuals and groups."" But law for Shapiro is not just any kind of plan. 
It is, he says, a conceptual truth that law is a plan with the aim "to remedy 
the moral deficiencies of the circumstances of legality."" Although "the sheer 
diversity of political objectives that actual legal systems have attempted to 
secure throughout human history suggests that the law often fails in its pri-
mary mission,"32  Shapiro still maintains that "it is part of the identity of law 
to have a moral mission."" Shapiro is less direct on the second component 
of the ideology I consider, but it is quite clear he accepts it as well. When he 
talks about morality, Shapiro reflects the view of morality as an unchanging 
pre-existing entity when he states that "it makes no sense to talk about in-
crementally developing ... morality."34  In a similar vein Shapiro writes that 
"moral norms are not able to solve coordination problems because morality 
concerns itself with principled action and coordination problems arise be-
cause of their arbitrary nature .1131 
These claims are unconvincing as conceptual claims supposedly true of 
all law whenever and wherever we find it. There are many things unques-
tionably considered as laws that are difficult to reconcile with the idea that 
they are there to address the kind of situations Shapiro talks about. One 
need not be committed to everything said by public choice theorists to ac-
knowledge that many laws are enacted with different aims. Such cases are 
not instances of an unfortunate failure (due to a miscalculation, lack of fore-
sight, etc.) to fulfill law's purported conceptual aim, but cases in which the 
28  Gardner, Law as a Leap ofFaith (n. 23) 209. 
29  Ibid. 163. If being moral is akin to being rational, what counts as a "moral problem" is not 
entirely clear. 
30  Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (Harvard University Press 2011) 200. Ibid. 213. 
52  Ibid. 213-14. 31 Ibid. 215. 14 Ibid. 128. 
11  Ibid. 201. These claims are by no means obvious. See, e.g., Philip Kitcher, 7he Ethical Project 
(Harvard University Press 2011) 2, passim ("Ethics emerges as a human phenomenon, permanently 
unfinished. We, collectively, made it up, and have developed, refined, and distorted it, generation 
by generation."). The view that at least parts of morality have emerged as responses to coordination 
problems is also familiar. See, e.g., Robert Sugden, The Economics ofRights, Co-Operation and Welfare 
(2nd edn,, Palgrave Macmillan 2004), 
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conscious aim motivating the legislation is not moral. The puzzle is not just 
empirical: surprisingly for a project intended to defend aversion of legal posi-
tivism, Shapiro seems committed to the view that a duly enacted statute that 
was adopted with an immoral aim is thereby not law. This sounds like an af-
firmation of a variant of natural law theory rather than a challenge to it: it is 
the view that while a putative law that is in fact unjust remains valid law, a 
law designed to be unjust (thereby lacking in moral aim) is not law, perhaps 
even if it is in fact just. 
At the other end of the positivist/natural law divide, Allan Beever is 
similarly committed to the two ideas that dominate contemporary juris-
prudence. In an attempt to explain the declaratory theory of the common 
law, he distinguishes between positive law and some kind of higher, 
"enduring," law. The latter for him is simply a different name for inter-
personal morality. It is not a human creation, it is unchanging, and it can 
be discovered by reason. Beever also states that it is the aim of human law 
to match the natural law and help enforce it. The two elements of the 
C) prevailing ideology are captured by his claim that "the law that remains 
unaltered is not positive law but something more abstract and enduring. 
Fulfilling the law is a matter of making the positive law more accurately 
reflect this abstract and enduring law." 16  It follows, as Beever also says, that 
the common law is merely the public record of successive human efforts 
to discover this unchanging law.37  Reflecting on this higher law aims to 
"provide principles capable of guiding (not determining) deliberations" on 
C. novel cases.38  Once we separate a functional conception of law from con-
$ sequentialist morality, it is easy to see that Beever too is committed to the 
idea that law should match, and is ultimately necessary in order to main-
tam, this unchanging law. 
4.2 The Ideological Space 
Perhaps the single most important aspect of this dominant contemporary 
ideology is that law is about guidance. The view of law as an artifact fits 
36  Allan Beever, "The Declaratory Theory of Law" (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
421,428-9. 
x' See Allan Beever, "How to Have a Common Private Law: The Presuppositions of Legal 
Conversation" in Andrew Robertson and Michael Tilbury (eds.), The Common Law of Obligations: 
Divergence and Unity (Hart Publishing 2016) 215, 227; but see Dan Friel, "The Philosophies of the 
Common Law and their Implications: Common Law Divergences, Public Authority Liability, and the 
Future of a Common Law World" in ibid. 233, for casting doubt on this view. 
38  Beever, "The Declaratory Theory of Law" (n. 36) 442. 
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right into this view, as it presents law as a kind of signpost for confused 
humans to follow. It is a view of law as a tool designed by humans to 
ultimately attain a better life. In legal philosophers' discourse (and 
this may reflect the influence of natural-law thinking) as far as the law 
is concerned, a "better life" means a more moral life. This is why law's 
success is measured by its correspondence to, and ability to maintain and 
promote, morality. Of course, different scholars may have different views 
about morality and what it requires, but in the way the boundaries be-
tween legal and moral philosophy are drawn, this debate is not part of 
jurisprudence. Disagreement on this latter question (a question of political 
philosophy) is consistent with agreement that law is (primarily, essentially) 
a tool for maintaining and promoting morality. Against this agreement, 
the remaining jurisprudential disputes between legal positivism and nat-
ural law theory are concerned with fairly marginal points. The questions 
whether morally faulty specimens of putative law are not law or merely 
area "perversion of law," or the question whether the unchanging norms 
that law should match are to be considered a kind of law ("natural law") or 
something else ("morality"), are fairly insignificant against a backdrop of 
vast agreement.39  What matters for the present discussion is that because 
so much is shared across the supposedly wide chasm that separates legal 
positivism and natural law theory, it is natural to think of it as "concep-
tual" truths. 
I identified two components that make up the dominant law-as-artifact, 
on the basis of which we can identify four theoretical possibilities (only three 
of them are realized). 
Table 12.3 The ideological space around law-as-artifact 
Law as non-artifact Law as artifact 
The idealfor law is the N/A Contemporary legal 
imitation of morality positivism, contemporary 
natural law theory 
Constructivism Common law theory, Classical legal 
Ronald Dworkin positivism: Thomas 
Hobbes, Jeremy 
Bentham 
" Gardner is thus correct to call his position "nearly natural law" in Gardner, Law as a Leap of 
Faith (n. 23) ch. 6. 
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Table 12.3 identifies two alternatives to the law-as-artifact view. As this 
chapter is concerned with the common law, I will say little about one of them, 
the one I call "classical legal positivism," except to note that unlike contem-
porary legal positivism, this view is a real alternative to natural law theory;41 
There are many important differences between classical and contemporary 
legal positivism, but they share the Enlightenment idea of the possibility of 
progress through human endeavor. Law fits into this picture as a tool ("arti-
fact"), perhaps the primary tool by which such progress is to be attained. 41 
Once identified, this idea can also be seen in Hart's account of the change 
from the prelegal to the legal society; explained in terms of the gains in efficiency 
it provides. Hart insists that for law to exist, there has to be a legal system, which 
comes into being when some institutional mechanisms are introduced, almost 
inevitably by design, to improve the pre-legal norms' efficiency at providing 
guidance. The same commitment is even more evident in the Razian "service 
conception" of authority. On the basis of this view Raz presented law's authority 
as grounded in its "superior knowledge" and likened the law to a "knowledgeable 
D friend.1142  At other times, the law co-ordinates the actions of different individuals. 
Either way, this is an instrumental conception of law in which the law's raison 
d'être is its ability to direct people's action in a way that will help people comply 
with reasons that exist regardless of the law. It is for this reason that the ability 
to guide conduct is so central to his view of law and has also been central to his 
well-known argument in support of exclusive legal positivism. 
Raz made the link between this view and the ideology of improvement clear 
When he said: "We take legislation as the base [of an account of law] because 
of its centrality to the understanding of law and of the governance of human 
affairs by deliberate decisions of human institutions appointed to control and 
give direction to human conduct and to social change.1143  This view, which sees 
conscious acts of legislation as the paradigmatic case for law because they are 
human devices to "control and give direction to human conduct" inevitably 
treats customary law and the common law as less central cases of law. 
Not only does this view make legislation a more central case of law, it 
is quite difficult to account for the common law within it, because the 
40  See Dan Priel, "Toward Classical Legal Positivism" (2015) 101 Virginia Law Review 987. See 
also the remark on Bentham in the concluding paragraph of this section. 
41  Recent years have seen the proliferation of so many "Enlightenments" that the term almost lost 
all meaning. Even thinkers like Edmund Burke and Adam Ferguson, which I posit in opposition to 
the Enlightenment idea I discuss in the text, have been described by some as adherents to a more 
"moderate" or "pragmatic" Enlightenment, in contrast to a more "radical" or "rigid" Enlightenment. 
The labels matter less than the difference in ideas. 
42  Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (n. 15) 348. 
Ibid. 301; cf. Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation (n. 18) 320. 
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suggestion that judges are some kind of moral experts, or experts in solving 
co-ordination problems, is implausible. It is hard to think of any judge, 
including the acknowledged "great judges" of the common law (Mansfield, 
Holmes, Cardozo, Atkin) as a moral expert, and it is hard to think of any of 
their decisions as great essays in moral philosophy. The suggestion that they 
possessed any special knowledge or insight on coordination problems is, if 
anything, even less plausible. Now, it is true that Raz's view is consistent with 
the possibility that the common law claims such authority but is uniformly 
failing at actually having it. 'While theoretically possible, I think such a con-
clusion suggests an alternative, one in which the authority of the common 
law is best explained as a rejection of this ideology of improvement, rather 
than a failed embrace of it. 
4.3 The Common Law as Tradition 
One prominent strand in common-law thought is best understood as reflecting 
an ideology that fundamentally rejects the idea of rational design as a guiding 
principle for the improvement of civil society; Correspondingly, it is also based 
on a competing theory of authority. Hayek challenged the Enlightenment idea 
of the organization of society; which he associated with Hobbes and Bentham; 
he contrasted it with a view he found reflected, among other places, in "a trad-
ition rooted in the jurisprudence of the common law," and he quoted Scottish 
philosopher Adam Ferguson for the idea that human institutions are "the result 
of human action but not the execution of human design." This remark parallels 
the distinction between the broad (and trivial) sense of law's artifactuality (law is 
the product of human action) and the non-trivial sense of its artifactuality (law 
is the product of conscious design). Hayek thus contrasted legal design with 
"rules [that] have never been deliberately invented but have grown through a 
gradual process of trial and error.... In most instances... [of such law-making] 
nobody knows or has ever known all the reasons and considerations that have 
led to a rule being given a particular form."" 
According to another statement of this view, coming from Michael 
Oakeshott, 
[t]he laws of civil association ... are not imposed upon an already shaped and 
articulated engagement, they relate to the miscellaneous, unforeseeable choices and 
transactions of agents each concerned to live the life of a 'man like me', who are 
44  EA. Hayek, The Constitution ofLiberty (Roudege & Kegan Paul 1960) 56, 57, quoting Adam 
Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (A. Kincaid and J. Bell 1767) 187. Ferguson also 
wrote: "No constitution is formed by concert, no government copied from a plan." Ibid. 188. 
Hayek, The Constitution ofLiberty (n. 44) 157. 
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joined in no common purpose or engagement, who may be strangers to one another 
Nor do they [i.e., these laws] impose any such common purpose upon those who 
fall within their jurisdiction: they are not devices for engineering the promotion of a 
common interest .46 
How do we explain the contrast between this view and the law-as-artifact 
view? One possibility is to say that this is a competing conceptual claim 
about law, but one that happens to be false. If that was indeed Oakeshott and 
Hayek's aim, then they are equally guilty of confusing the ideological with 
the conceptual. But I think this is an implausible reading of these thinkers. 
Oakeshott presented his view of law as part of a broader avowedly "conser-
vative" political theory. In his writings Oakeshott repeatedly chastised what 
he called—always in scare quotes—"rationalism," the view that perceives of 
politics as a science in which external goals are defined and then uses various 
means (including, prominently, laws) to pursue them .41  The idea of law as an 
artifact designed to match pre-existing morality or natural law is the jurispru-
dential manifestation of the rationalistic woridview that he rejected. 
Common-law practice fits this view. To put this bluntly, most common-law 
practice does not look like lawyers and judges care much whether universal 
moral truths exist; and even if they exist, there is rarely a suggestion that to 
find them is relevant, let alone decisive, to solving "novel" cases. Lord Justice 
Scrutton emphasized this point almost a century ago when he said that, "just-
ice is not what we strive after in the Courts, paradoxical as it may seem. 
We are not trying to do justice, if you mean by justice some moral standard 
which is not the law of England.1148  Of course, the statement of a single judge, 
influential though he may have been, is not proof of my argument, but I con-
tend that what Scrutton said is a fair representation of common law practice, 
definitely in England at the time he was writing. 
Beyond such exegetical matters, to dismiss this view as a misunderstanding 
of the authority of the common law is theoretically problematic. It is true that 
one may consistently hold that some people believe that tradition is a source 
of legitimate authority and that such beliefs are mistaken. But if people 
hold such a view they are likely to shape their practices accordingly. Thus, 
46  Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Clarendon Press 1975) 129. See also Michael 
Oakeshott, "The Rule of Law" in On History and Other Essays (Blackwell 1983) 119, 136: "The ex-
pression, 'the rule of law', taken precisely, stands for a mode of moral association exclusively in terms 
of the recognition of the authority of known, non-instrumental rules (that is, laws) which impose 
obligations to subscribe to adverbial conditions in the performance of self-chosen actions of all who 
fall within their jurisdiction." 
41  This is a recurring theme in Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays 
(expanded edn., Liberty Fund 1991). 
48  T.E. Scrutton, "The Work of the Commercial Courts" (192 1) 1 Cambridge Law Journal 6, 8. 
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even if one believes that a traditionary view of authority can never provide a 
successful basis for legitimate authority, the fact that people believe that it is, 
is important for understanding a practice that involves people who do. This 
point was implicitly accepted by Raz when he said that, 
since our own concept is liable to be forever in flux, since legal theory is itself part 
of the culture to which 'our' concept of law belongs, it is inevitable that legal theory 
is no mere passive mirror of the concepts of that culture. To the extent that legal 
theorists acquire influence their views tend to be self-verifying. This led some post-
modernists to identify theory with advocacy. This is a misleading view. Theory aims 
at understanding. By and large, only bad theory can lead to change. If its wrong 
conclusions are accepted their acceptance may lead to a change in the self-understanding 
of the culture which will make the bad theory true. But such bad theories succeed only 
by not trying, i.e. by claiming—however erroneously—that they state how things 
are, and not that they advocate change. Once they avow that they advocate change 
they lose the claim they have on our attention, they join reformers in an activity to be 
judged by different standards altogether.49 
Raz is almost correct here. He is right that when people offer certain 
understandings of the practice they can alter the practice and with it its 
underlying philosophy. But he is wrong to say that this is true only in the case 
of "bad theory," one that is mistaken. All accounts of the practice have po-
tential to influence it, even when they do so by affirming a prevailing under-
standing of it. This is particularly clear when we remember that there is never a 
single account of a practice. 'What always exists are competing views presented 
more-or-less simultaneously. "Correct" and "incorrect" accounts thus com-
pete in the marketplace of ideas; and since these competing views are held 
by practitioners, they constantly push the practice in different directions. In 
any case, even if one accepts Raz's view that only "bad theory" can change the 
practice, it follows from what he says that if a bad theory becomes sufficiently 
influential, it can change the practice to such a degree that it eventually will 
become the "good theory" of the practice. This means that the prevalence of 
traditionary ideas about the common law can influence (and as a historical 
matter, has influenced) the practice of law. If it is shown that much common-
law practice has in fact been based on this traditionary ideology, to maintain 
the view that all law is an artifact implies that much of the common law is not 
law. 'While possible, that would be a radically revisionist view of law, not one 
that supposedly captures (roughly) all phenomena humans have identified as 
law throughout history. 
49 Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation (n. 18) 98- 9 (emphasis added). 
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So this way of responding to this view fails. A second response might be 
that the traditionary view is based on a particular political ideology, and as 
such it comes into play only after the non-ideological, conceptual analysis 
of law has been completed.5° This response will thus argue that this clearly 
ideological view of the common law rests on a universal conceptual basis. 
But this second response is also implausible. One way of demonstrating this 
is by pointing out that Raz's words quoted earlier about legislation as central 
to understanding law are correct when read against the background of the 
Enlightenment ideology of improvement through law. But this view is not a 
neutral basis on which conservative political thinkers then added a second, 
political layer. For some, legislation is not the paradigm of law, but a degen-
erate, perverse, example of it.5' 
Similarly, Hayek and Oakeshott did not think that their favored concep-
tion of law (in which it is not an object designed for guidance) is a politically 
motivated layer added onto a conceptual, morally neutral truth that law is 
about guidance. They rejected the idea of law-as-artifact designed to guide 
altogether. On the traditionary view, law is not a solution to a problem that 
Cn 
can be identified in advance and then acted upon when the right time comes. 
Rather, it is a standard that reflects, as Oakeshott put it, "current moral ac-
rn tivity" within a particular community. To use his example, what counts as 
"reasonable care" is "not something that can be known in advance" (thus 
ç ruling out the idea of guidance); instead it reflects "knowledge of how to behave well which belongs to our way of living."52 This view is not political 
disagreement added to a layer of conceptual agreement; it is a challenge to 
the "conceptual" foundation. Law on this view is not put in place where 
r custom fails; it is a continuation of, a manifestation of, custom. It is thus not 
a way of guiding people for the sake of attaining some teleological ("external") 
function, but a cultural ("internal") one. 
I think the most plausible way of understanding this disagreement is also 
the most straightforward one, namely as reflecting two conflicting views about 
law, both of which are derived from conflicting ideologies. This claim, if 
accepted, raises another set of questions. When Oakeshott made these claims, 
they were by no means novel. The association of the common law with the 
° Cf. Julie Dickson, "Ours Is a Broad Church: Indirectly Evaluative Legal Philosophy as a Facet 
of jurisprudential Inquiry" (2015) 6 Jurisprudence 207, 215, 229. 
51  See, e.g., James C. Carter, The Proposed Codification of our Common Law (Evening Post Job 
Printing Office 1884) 51 ("The decadence [of Rome] was marked by a corresponding decline 
in jurisprudence, and the extension of the province of legislation over the proper domain of the 
unwritten law."). 
52  Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (n. 47) 130, also 117. Oakeshott explicitly 
rejects the idea that law should match natural law. Ibid. 51, 67, 423. 
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political theory of tradition is at least as old as Edmund Burke, if not older,53 
Given this long historical provenance, it is a good question why it has been 
largely ignored by legal philosophers. To the little extent that they even paid 
attention to proponents of this view, they apparently did not see them as having 
any bearing on their own work. I think there are three main reasons that to-
gether go a long way toward an explanation. The first is the prevailing (albeit 
mistaken) view that jurisprudence is a value-neutral search for the nature of 
law. This attitude has blinded many contemporary writers to the ideological 
basis of contemporary jurisprudence. As a result, writings that were perceived 
as clearly ideological could be ignored as irrelevant to the enterprise of general 
jurisprudence. The second is the relative lack of interest among contemporary 
legal philosophers in legal practice (and the occasional denigration of legal 
theorists who took an interest in it as not really legal philosophers), as well as 
their lack of interest in the history of law and jurisprudence. This allowed jur-
isprudential debates to be conducted at a level of abstraction at which realities 
about the practice did not adequately inform the theories that were supposed 
to describe it. Insufficient attention to legal history has led to the elevation of 
familiar features of contemporary western law to the level of conceptual truths 
about all law. Even the most fervent admirer of the common law will admit 
that it is far less significant today than it once was,54  and the dominance of 
statutes has influenced thinking on the common law as well. But these are 
contingent facts about the present-day regulatory state, not timeless verities. 
The third reason has more to do with the fact that the traditionary ideology 
is relatively unpopular among legal academics. For all their differences (juris-
prudential as well as, I suspect, political), Gardner, Shapiro, and Beever, whose 
work I briefly discussed earlier, share the view that morality is an unchanging 
set of norms, which law should match. They may disagree on what this inde-
pendent unchanging morality requires, but not on its "nature." A view that 
depended on a fundamentally different understanding of morality could thus 
be ignored, or when not ignored, misunderstood. 
This is enough to show that even if contemporary legal philosophy is eth-
ically neutral, it is not metaethically neutral. For the sake of my argument, 
11 For various formulations of the idea see J.G.A. Pocock, "Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A 
Problem in the History of Ideas" (1960) 3 Histori calJournal 125; Anthony T. Kronman, "Precedent 
and Tradition" (1990) 99 Yale Law Journal 1029; Gerald J. Postema, "Philosophy of the Common 
Law" in Jules L. Coleman and Scott J. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook ofJurisprudencc and 
the Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press 2002) 588; David Strauss, The Living Constitution 
(Oxford University Press 2010); cf. Martin Krygier, "Law as Tradition" (1986) 5 Law and 
Philosophy 237. 
Cf. Dan Friel, "The Political Origins of English Private Law" (2015) 40 Journal of Law and 
Society 481, 501-2. 
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it does not matter whether this metaethical view is correct; it matters, how-
ever, whether it was accepted by important practitioners of the common law. 
I have attempted to demonstrate that it was; my subsequent discussion was 
meant to show that this approach goes beyond mere difference in law-making 
technique (some laws happen to be made by legislatures, others by courts). It 
reflects a different view about the nature of political authority, and arguably 
also the nature of morality. 
These last remarks put Bentham's views on the common law in clearer 
light. Bentham had many bad things to say about Blackstone, and he char-
acteristically spelled those out in exhaustive detail over hundreds of pages. 
But he did not think that Blackstone's definition of law was conceptually 
wrong. Blackstone, he said, "has a right to put into his idea of [municipal 
Law] what he pleases.1155  This explains why Bentham did not contradict him-
self when he said that the common law is not real law.56  When he said this, 
he was not making a conceptual claim, but a normative one. Bentham was 
openly dismissive of the authority of tradition, calling it the "wisdom of the 
cradle,"57  and based his entire corpus on an overriding commitment to the 
Enlightenment ideal of social improvement through the rational application 
of the scientific method to human affairs. Not being able to fit the common 
rn law within this, patently normative view, he rejected it. But it is not that his 
dislike for the common law was political, while his dismissal of it as non-law 
was conceptual. Both were part of the same ideological view. 
Ci) ' 
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5. The Implications of Thinking about Law as an Artifact 
I began this chapter by drawing a distinction between two possible definitions 
of artifactuality. On the broader definition, something is an artifact if it is the 
product of human efforts. I said that this view is trivial and not contested by 
any present-day legal theorist. But it does have an interesting implication: if 
law is an artifact even in this broad sense, it makes as much sense to think 
that there is a philosophical task of discovering its nature as there is a philo-
sophical task of discovering the nature of cars. It is not (just) that such a task 
seems utterly pointless, it is that the answer to it is one to which philosophers 
55  Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government (Clarendon 
Press 1977) 38. 
56 See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, "Legislator of the World' Writings on Codification, Law, and 
Education (Oxford University Press 1998) 193, where he talks about the "unreal, not really-existing, 
imaginary, fictitious, spurious judge-made law... [known by the] unexpressive, uncharacteristic and 
unappropriate names of common law and unwritten law." 
57  Jeremy Bentham, The Book ofFallacies (Oxford University Press 2015) 173. 
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have little to contribute. Cars, and humans' attitudes about them, have a his-
tory; a sociology; a technology; not self-evident "truisms" to be discovered by 
philosophical reflection. If law is an artifact, it is hard to see why it should be 
any different. 
This chapter has attempted to show one way in which thinking about law 
as an artifact changes the way we should analyze it. More generally, I think 
openness to law's artifactuality should lead legal philosophers to realize 
that science, essential nature, and discovery are not the right models for 
jurisprudence. As with other artifacts, it is engineering, development, and 
construction. 
